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I. INTRODUCTION

As with many areas of the law, an exploration of tort theory often resembles an
attempt to penetrate a labyrinth filled with dizzying turns, dead ends, and paths that
lead back to where you began. Compared to "proximate causation" with its winding
corridors filled with policy and foreseeability, the realm of "cause-in-fact" might
seem trivial to navigate. Directions have been posted, and many of the pitfalls and
Punji traps have been covered over.

*J.D. expected, May 2009, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law; B.F.A. Bowling Green State University. The author would like to thank Professor
Christopher Sagers for his insightful comments and advice on this Note. The author would
also like to thank Melanie Shwab. who endured more discussion of tort causation rules than
any one person should have to bear.
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The problems presented by "tortfeasor indeterminacy" are perhaps the greatest
remaining point of contention in the otherwise generally overlooked requirement of
cause-in-fact. 1 The issue is deceptively simple; several defendants have breached a
duty to the plaintiff and one of their breaches is the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury,
but it is impossible to tell which one. 2 As a result. the plaintiff cannot meet his
3
evidentiary burden on the element of cause-in-fact and is unable to recover. In
response to the plaintiff's dilemma, courts have developed the doctrines of
"alternative liability" and "market-share Iiability." 4
Yet many courts and
commentators have rejected these solutions as threats to the very structure of the tort
law system. 5 Attempts to conceptualize the doctrines have produced a multitude of
conflicting explanations. many of which invoke the very rationales that have led to
judicial reluctance in utilizing the doctrines."
This Note will argue that previous attempts to explain alternative liability are
unsatisfactory because they are inconsistent with traditional notions of cause-in-fact.
Rather than attempting to explain alternative liability as a revolutionary concept, this
examination will demonstrate that alternative liability can be completely explained
by a careful application of traditional tort principles. That result will depend on
recognition of a distinction between the original injury suffered by the plaintiff and
the secondary injury that alternative liability allows recovery for-the loss of remedy
for the original injury. Once this distinction is recognized, the current limitations on
alternative liability are diminished and its modification into market-share liability is
rendered unnecessary.
In reaching its conclusion, Part JI.A of this Note will discuss the general
requirements of cause-in-fact, define the problem of tortfeasor indeterminacy, and
explore the difficulties it creates. Part II.B will examine alternative liability, the
judicial solution developed by courts in response to tortfeasor indeterminacy. Part
II.C will then examine the modification of alternative liability into market-share
liability. Part liLA will examine previous explanations promulgated for alternative
liability and market-share liability, showing why each is unsatisfactory. Part III.B
will present a new explanation for alternative liability based on application of
traditional tort rules to an independent cause of action for plaintiff's loss of remedy.
Parts III.C and III.D will propose potential legal bases for this cause of action. Part
III.E will examine the operation of this new cause of action. Part III.F will then
demonstrate how this new explanation leads to the conclusion that joint and several
liability, rather than the market-share modification, is the appropriate means for
apportioning liability under alternative liability.

1
1ndeed, one commentator has called market-share liability, one of the doctrinal responses
to tortfeasor indeterminacy, "one of the most controver~ial doctrines in tort law." Mark A.
Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of'AlternatiJ•e Liabilitv and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 447,447 (2006).

2

See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.

3

See inji·a note 27.

4

See infra Parts II.B-C.

5

See infra Part liLA.

6

See infra Part liLA.
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II. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA OF TORTFEASOR INDETERMINACY
A. ldent(fying the Dilemma

A generally recognized element of any plaintiff's prima facie tort cause of action
7
is causation.
Professors Prosser and Keeton define the causal analysis as a
determination of whether there is "some reasonable connection between the act or
omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." 8 The
causal analysis consists of two parts: the initial determination of cause "in-fact" and
the subsequent determination of "proximate'' or "legal" cause. 9 Although not the
sole basis for imposing liability. cause-in-fact is traditionally considered one of the
requirements for liability to attach to the tortious conduct of a defendant. 10 This Note
is primarily concerned with a problematic issue that arises as part of the cause-in-fact
analysis.
At its most basic level. the cause-in-fact analysis is a determination of whether
the particular conduct of the defendant was a "necessary antecedent" to the harm that
the plaintiff has suffered. 11 This relation between conduct and harm is normally
expressed in terms of a ''but-for'' test. The harm to the plaintiff would not have
occurred but for the actions of the defendant or. phrased differently, if the defendant
had not acted as he did, the harm to the plaintiff would not have occurred. 12 On a
practical level then, the cause-in-fact requirement acts to prevent liability from
attaching to conduct that is not essential to the occutTence of the harm plaintiff has
suffered. 13
7

While causation problems are often most pronounced in cases of negligence, it is dear
that the element of causation is not confined to negligence. The requirement extends in some
form to every tort cause of action, including strict liability and the intentional torts. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984 ).
8

/d.

9

/d. at 263-65. In practice. the distinction may be somewhat artificial. It can be difficult
to determine where the cause-in-fact analysis ends and the proximate cause analysis begins.
As Prosser and Keeton note, the confusion is in part the result of a lack of precision in
language used to describe the two parts of the analysis, as well as a failure to recognize that
the cause-in-fact analysis necessarily involves a degree of non-factual hypothesizing. !d. This
hypothesizing "creates a mental picture of a situation identical to the actual facts of the case in
all respects save one: the defendant's wrongful conduct is now 'corrected' to the minimal
extent necessary to make it conform to the law's requirements." David W. Robertson, The
Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (1997).
10

11

KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 268.

/d. at 265.

12

1d. at 266. For illustrative purposes, it is helpful to break the cause-in-fact analysis down
into its five distinct steps:
(a) identify the injuries in suit; (b) identify the wrongful conduct; (c) mentally correct
the wrongful conduct to the extent necessary to make it lawful. leaving everything else
the same; (d) ask whether the injuries would still have occurred had the defendant
been acting correctly in that sense; and (e) answer the question.
Robertson, supra note 9, at 1771.
13
KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 266. It is important to note that necessity does not
always equate to sufficiency. The conduct of two tortfeasors might combine to work an
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In the simplest case of a single plaintiff and a single defendant tortfeasor, the butfor test functions with little problem. However, the introduction of a second
defendant tortfeasor derails the function of the test entirely in many cases. For
example, the conduct of two tortfeasors simultaneously affects the plaintiff, and
14
either tortfeasor' s conduct alone would produce the resulting harm to the plaintiff.
While it is correct to say that either tortfeasor's conduct was sufficient to cause the
resulting harm to the plaintiff, application of the but-for test leads to the immediate
conclusion that neither tortfeasor's conduct can correctly be termed necessary to the
occurrence of the resulting harm to the plaintiff. If either tortfeasor had not acted as
he did, the other's conduct would still have produced the harm. Dogmatic adherence
to the but-for test would render neither tortfeasor liable despite the fact that either's
conduct would be independently sufficient to create the harm to plaintiff. In
response to this anomalous result, the courts generally make an exception to the butfor test and substitute a "substantial factor" test in cases of multiple sufficient causes,
allowing liability to attach to the conduct of both tortfeasors. 15 The result is a
conception of the cause-in-fact inquiry in which the element of cause-in-fact is
established if the conduct is either necessary for the occurrence of the result or
sufficient for its occurrence.
This solution to the issue of multiple sufficient causes has been well received,
and it is not the purpose of this Note to question that warm reception or dissect the
substantial factor doctrine. 16 However, multiple sufficient causation is not the only
problematic issue that the requirement of but-for causation generates. Tortious
activity involving multiple potential tortfeasors may give rise to a variety of distinct
but related but-for causation issues. In response to those issues, courts have adopted
aggregate injury to plaintiff that neither tortfeasor's conduct would have accomplished alone.
In such a case, both tortfeasors' conduct is necessary to the resulting harm, but neither taken
individually is sufficient. However, the fact that neither tortfeasor's conduct is sufficient by
itself would not protect either from liability. Under well-established principles of causation,
"[e]ach of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire
harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 875 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS (TENTATIVE DRAFTS)§ 27 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005). Thus, liability attaches to all necessary causes of an aggregate harm and sufficiency
of the cause to the resulting harm is not required.
14

Professors Prosser and Keeton give this helpful illustration: "A stabs C with a knife and
B fractures C's skull with a rock; either wound would be fatal, and C dies from the effects of
both." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 266.
15

ld. at 266-67.
concerns of fact.

This exception is arguably based on concerns of policy as much as

16
/d. at 267. The readiness of courts to accept a modification to traditional notions of butfor causation may be attributable, in no small part, to Professors Prosser and Keeton's
reformulation of the substantial factor test in terms of but-for causation:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their combined
conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application of the butfor rule to them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause
in fact of the event.
/d. at 268. The willingness of courts to accept this modification of but-for causation in cases
of multiple sufficient causes will be of tremendous aid in understanding and justifying the
conclusion about alternative liability reached below.
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a corresponding variety of doctrinal solutions. This Note will refer to that loosely
affiliated group of doctrines as doctrines of "collective liability."
The focus of this Note is to examine and explain the related collective liability
doctrines of "alternative liability" and "market-share liability" adopted by some
courts to address the problems unique to the but-for causation issue of "tortfeasor
indeterminacy." 17 In a prototypical case involving tortfeasor indeterminacy, two
defendants have each behaved tortiously towards an injured plaintiff, but only one of
the defendants could possibly have caused the harm. Tortfeasor indeterminacy then
arises when circumstances render the plaintiff incapable of determining which of the
two defendants' conduct actually caused the harm, although it is clear that one of
them did. 18
Summers v. Tice 19 illustrates the situation well. The plaintiff, Summers, and the
two defendants, Tice and Simonson, were hunting for quail. 20 During the course of
the hunt, Tice and Simonson, shooting at a quail that had been flushed, both
discharged their shotguns in Summers' direction. 21 Summers was hit with birdshot
in the lip and in the eye. 22 At trial, Summers had little difficulty establishing that
both Tice and Simonson had breached a duty of care towards him. 21
Instead, the evidential difficulty arose at the cause-in-fact stage of the analysis.
While Summers had been hit twice, the pellet that lodged in his eye was the "major
factor in assessing damages," and in analyzing the tortfeasor indeterminacy issue the

17
At least one commentator refers to this but-for causation issue as "defendant
indeterminacy." SeeM. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian. Defendant Indeterminacy: New Wine
However, "tortfeasor indeterminacy" is a
into Old Skins, 67 LA. L. REV. 785 (2007).
preferable alternative because it better reflects the crux of the issue under a traditional
conception of but-for causation; that issue being that the identity of the tortfeasor among the
defendants cannot be determined by the plaintiff. Therefore, the remainder of this Note will
refer to the issue by that label.

18
It is important to distinguish tortfeasor indeterminacy from the deceptively similar
situation where circumstances make it impossible for the plaintiff to make the initial
determination whether any of multiple defendants has behaved tortiously towards him at all,
but the nature of the injury points towards the likelihood that someone has behaved tortiously.
See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945) (allowing plaintiff who suffered
suspicious injury while anesthetized to use doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against group of
hospital staff involved in his surgery). In contrast, all defendants have breached a tort duty in
a case involving tortfeasor indeterminacy; causation rather than breach of duty is the
problematic issue.

19

199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).

20

/d. at 2.

21/d.

22/d.
23
See id. Summers had cautioned Tice and Simonson before the hunt to "keep in line"
when shooting. /d. At the time of the shooting Summers had ascended a hill, putting him in
front of Tice and Simonson in a triangular pattern. !d. The evidence established that Tice and
Simonson could see Summers and knew his location at the time the shots were fired. /d. The
court found that evidence sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of care owed to Summers
by Tice and Simonson. !d.
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court concerned itself only with that pellet. 24 The pellet that lodged in Summers' eye
could have come from the gun of Tice or Simonson and had certainly come from one
of them. 25 However, it was impossible to make any determination that the pellet
more likely than not had come from the gun of one rather than the other. 26 As the
situation stood, Summers was unable to meet his burden of proof on cause-in-fact
with regard to either Tice or Simonson. 27
If Summers was to meet his burden of proof, he would have to resort to some
form of collective liability theory that would allow him to prove cause-in-fact against
Tice and Simonson as a group, rather than individually. The court first examined
whether the doctrine of concert of action 2s would allow Summers to attach liability to
the conduct of both defendants. 29 If Summers could make a case for application of
concert of action liability, it would be unnecessary for him to prove that one
defendant, rather than the other, was the cause-in-fact of the injury to his eye 30
24

/d. at 3. The court's decision to disregard the second pellet that lodged in Summers' lip
is inconsequential for purposes of exploring the issue of tortfeasor indeterminacy because,
even if the court had concerned itself with both pellets. there was the distinct pos~ihility that
both pellets had come from the same gun. !d.
25

/d. Applying the but-for test, it is clear that the conduct of the defendant whose shot hit
Summers was both the necessary and sufficient cause of the injury to Summers' eye. The
other defendant's conduct was neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of the injury to the
eye. See id.
26

Tice and Simonson were both using 12 gauge shotguns and 7V2 size birdshot. /d. at 2.

27

The burden of proof borne by the plaintiff with regards to causation is the typical
preponderance of the evidence standard that it is "more likely than not that the conduct of the
defendant was a cause in fact of the result.'' KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 269. Thw•. when
the "probabilities ... are evenly balanced" the plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof and
cannot establish the prima facie case. !d. The addition of a hypothetical third defendant
would further decrease the probability that any one defendant was the cause-in-fact of the
harm. Geistfeld, supra note I, at 455. The result is that because tortfeasor indeterminacy
always involves an even balance of probabilities between two or more defendants, the plaintiff
will never be able to meet his burden of proof and make his prima facie case.
28

The doctrine of concert of action liability states that:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with
him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 876 (1979).
29

Summers, 199 P.2d at 2-3.

30

This result becomes clear in light of the commentary. Once concert of action has been
established each defendant becomes vicariously "liab[le] for the acts of the others, as well as
for his own acts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 876 cmt. a (1979). Therefore. it is
irrelevant which defendant was actually the cause-in-fact of the harm because one defendant is
liable as the true cause-in-fact and the other defendant is vicariously liable under concert of
action liability.
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Ultimately, the court concluded that application of concert of action in similar cases
had "strain[edj that concept." 31 If Summers was to succeed, it would have to be on
some other theory of collective liability.
B. The Summers Solution: Alternative Liahilitv
The California Supreme Court was faced with a dilemma because, under
traditional tort principles, either Tice or Simonson was liable to Summers for his
injury, but it was impossible to tell which one. Then-existing theories of collective
liability were of no aid. In response, the court developed and applied a new theory
of collective liability that has come to be known as alternative liability.
The doctrine of alternative liability conceived by the Summers court allows an
injured plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendants in cases of tortfeasor
indeterminacy. 32 Rather than require the plaintiff to "pin the injury'' on a particular
defendant, all defendants are presumed liable. and a defendant must ·'absolve himself
if he can."" fn this way, the plaintiff's evidentiary problem is solved by exempting
him from the requirement of identifying the tortfeasor among the defendants. \.J
The Summers court justified this result on several grounds. The foremost
justification given by the court was the "practical unfairness" that Summers would
be left without redress for his injury simply because he could not identify which
defendant had most likely injured him. 35 The court emphasized that both Tice and
Simonson had breached the duty of care owed to Summers and that one of the two
had certainly caused the injury to Summers' eye. \6 Given the ''relative position of

31

Summers, 199 P.2d at 3. The coutt did not elaborate on precisely why application of
concert of action liability to the facts of the case would be inappropriate. but an examination
of the requirements of the doctrine are revealing. Section (a) requires tortious conduct that is
"in concert" or "pursuant to a common design"' between the defendants and sections (b) and
(c) require that the second defendant give '"substantial assistance" or "encouragement" to the
tortious conduct of the first. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Tice and
Simonson were clearly not acting as part of a common design to shoot Summers: there is no
apparent reason to believe that they even acted as part of a common design to ~hoot at the
quail. Likewise, there is nothing to compel a conclusion that one assisted the other or
encouraged him. The shots were independent of each other and either simultaneous or in
quick succession. The conduct is simply not indicative of the explicit or implicit ··agreement
to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result"" that the
doctrine is meant to address. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torns 876 cmt. a ( 1979).

*

32

Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.

3.1/d.
34
The American Law Institute adopted the California Supreme Court's alternative liability
theory in this formulation:
Where the conduct of two or more actor~ is tortious, and it is proved that harm has
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it. the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not cauo;ed
the harm.
RESTATEMENT(SECONIJ)OFTORTS 4338(3) (1965).

*

35

Summers. 199 P.2d at 3--4 (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES UN lllF LAW OF
TORTS§ 153 (1912)).
36

Id. at 4.
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the parties," the fair solution was to place the burden of an unjust loss on the
defendant that, while he had not caused the injury, had certainly breached a duty to
Summers, rather than place the burden of an unjust loss on the totally innocent
Summers. 37 The court also stressed that in most cases the defendants will be better
able to offer evidence as to who caused the injury and would be free to introduce
such evidence in an effort to extricate themselves from liability. 1 x
With the aid of the new alternative liability rule, Summers was able to make his
prima facie case of liability against Tice and Simonson. 39 For the same reasons that
it shifted the burden regarding causation to the defendants, the court further held that
Tice and Simonson were jointly liable for the whole harm and shifted the burden of
proof on apportionment to them as well. 40 Summers was free to collect his full
recovery from the defendants in any way he could, and it would then be up to Tice
and Simonson to litigate apportionment between each other. 41
C. Expanding the Solution: Market-Share Liability

Thirty-two years after the Summers decision, the California Supreme Court
expanded the doctrine of alternative liability in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 42
Once again, the court was faced with a troubling case of tortfeasor indeterminacy.
Sindell and her fellow class members were suffering from cancer43 as a result of their
mothers' use of the drug diethylstilbesterol (DES) during pregnancy. 44 The
complaint named eleven manufacturers of DES. 45 However, Sindell was unable to
identify the manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother due to the nature of the
drug and the circumstances surrounding its distribution. 46 Therefore, the trial court

37/d.
38

/d. It seems unlikely that this was the primary justification in the mind of the court.
Indeed, it has been pointed out that in Summers itself the defendants did not appear to have
any "better access to the evidence than the plaintiff." Geistfeld, supra note l, at 473.
39

Summers, 199 P.2d at 5.

40/d.
41/d.
42

607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).

43

The plaintiffs exhibited adenocarcinoma, a form of cancer with a minimum ten to twelve
year latency period, after which deadly cervical and vaginal growths quickly begin to spread.
/d. at 925. In addition, the plaintiffs exhibited precancerous cervical and vaginal growths
called adenosis. /d.
44

DES is a synthetic form of estrogen that was marketed for the prevention of miscarriages
from 1947 until 1971. !d.
45/d.
46

DES was an unpatented fungible drug, "produced from a common ... formula" and
customarily prescribed by its "generic rather than its brand name.'" Id. at 926. Identification
of a particular manufacturer was made even more difficult because as many as 300 companies
manufactured DES during the twenty-four years it was marketed for use by pregnant women.
Geistfeld, supra note I, at 477. Moreover, manufacturers came and went from the DES
market throughout the relevant period. !d. These factors combined with the long latency
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dismissed the complaint for failure to identify the defendant whose product had
47
On appeal, the California Supreme Court examined and found
caused the injury.
inapplicable several theories of collective liability, including Summers' alternative
liability rule. Instead, the court opted to apply a new variant of alternative liability
that is now known as market-share liability.
As in Summers, one of the alleged theories of recovery against the multiple
defendants was concert of action liability. Sindell sought to hold the defendant drug
companies jointly liable under a concert of action theory based on "express and
implied agreements" and "collaboration" in the development, approval, and
marketing of DES. 48 The court rejected the concert of action theory on grounds that
there was no agreement between the defendants to commit the tortious act. 44 The
defendants had acted in a "parallel" but independent manner, and the composition of
the drug was dictated by its scientific formula rather than by any understanding
between the defendants. 5°
Likewise, the court considered but rejected recovery against all defendants based
on the theory of enterprise liability first developed in Hall v. E./. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. 51 Unlike the defendants in Hall, the DES manufacturers had not
"delegated some functions relating to safety to a trade association"; rather, the
industry standard was dictated to a significant degree by the Food and Drug
Administration. 52 Therefore, the court refused to apply industry-wide liability under
the Hall rationale because there was no indication that the DES manufacturers had
jointly controlled the risk. 5 3
The court also considered alternative liability as a possible solution in the DES
scenario, ultimately concluding that the Summers formulation could not be fairly
applied. 54 The sheer number of possible tortfeasors was the decisive factor militating
against application of alternative liability in Sindell. 55 The court observed that in
Summers there was a fifty percent probability that each defendant was the tortfeasor
because there were only two defendants who had breached a duty to the plaintifr_0 6
period of the injury resulted in tortfeasor indeterminacy problems in much of the DES
litigation.
47

Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.

48

/d. at 932.

49/d.
50

/d. at 932-33.

51

345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In Hall, the district court contemplated shifting the
burden on causation to members of an industry after it was established that a product
manufactured by some member of the industry had caused an injury but the manufacturer
could not be identified. /d. at 374. This result was justified by the defendants' joint control of
the risk of injury through delegation of certain safety concerns to the industry's trade
association. /d. at 374-78.
52

Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935.

53/d.
54

/d. at 931.

55/d.
56/d.
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In contrast, hundreds of manufacturers had produced DES: the probability that any of
the named defendants had produced the specific DES that caused Sindell's injury
57
was so low that ''it would be unfair to require each defendant to exonerate itself.''
Despite finding Summers' pure alternative liability inapplicable to the DES
scenario, the court recognized that the same concerns of fairness were present
because defendants who had behaved tortiously might escape liability, and the
innocent plaintiff would be left without any remedy. 5s Therefore, the situation called
for some modification of alternative liability that would compensate for the reduced
probability that a particular defendant's product was truly the cause-in-fact of
Sindell's injury. The court's solution was to allow the burden on causation to shift to
the defendants if a "substantial share" of the market was joined in the action, limiting
the liability of each defendant in proportion to its share of the DES marketed for use
in preventing miscarriages. 5Y So long as a "substantial share" of the market was
joined, the probability that the true tortfeasor was among the defendants would
increase, and the unfairness of requiring each defendant to exonerate himself from
liability would be "significantly diminished." 60 The court acknowledged that under
this new doctrine, some defendants would be held liable for an injury despite that
injury being caused by a different manufacturer, but justified this result on the
grounds that "each manufacturer's liability for an injury would be approximately
equivalent to the [total] damages caused by fall] the DES it manufactured." 61
III. MAKING SENSE OF ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY AND MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY
A. Previous Explanationsj(Jr Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability

Alternative liability and market-share liability raise significant questions as to
their compatibility with the current tort regime in which establishing the defendant's
conduct as the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury is still generally regarded as a
requirement for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case for liability. While a fair
number of jurisdictions have adopted alternative liability and/or market-share
liability." 2 the perceived inconsistency with traditional tort law has led many other
57/d.
5

' /d.

at 936.

59

/d. at 937. At first blush, the market-share theory adopted by the court bears a great
resemblance to the enterprise liability theory first proposed in Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 374.
However, the court was quick to point out that it was not allowing plaintiff to proceed on
enterprise liability. Sindell. 607 P.2d at 933-36. Market-share liability as adopted by the
California Supreme Court can be distinguished from enterprise liability by the absence of a
requirement that the defendants exerci'e some form of joint control over the risk of injury
posed by the industry's product. Despite this distinction, significant similarities between the
two theories are still present because the court, when creating market-share liability, was
highly influenced by a law review comment proposing a modified version of enterprise
liability. !d. For the article relied on by the court, see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theorv
of" Enterprise Liahi/itv, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 ( 1978).
.

wSinde/1, 607 P.2d at 937.
61

/d. at 938.

62

See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453 (lOth Cir. 1988) (applying Nebraska
law to find alternative liability applicable against asbestos manufacturers); McCormack v.
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courts to reject one or both of the doctrines."' Even among courts that are less hostile
to alternative liability or market-share liability, the inherent limitations of the
doctrines as currently formulated often preclude their application in cases where they
are sorely needed. 64 The sharp divide between courts that praise the doctrines as
Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 19g5) (applying Massechusetts law to allow use of
market-share liability in DES context); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265
(D.S.D. I n3) (applying South Dakota law to allow use of market-share liability in DES
context); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla.l990) (allowing use of market-share
liability in DES context); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Div. of Miles Inc .. 823 P.2d 717 (Haw.
1991) (allowing use of market-share liability against manufacturers of tainted blood product);
Wysocki v. Reed, 583 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding alternative liability applicable
against heparin manufacturers); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984)
(allowing use of alternative liability in DES context): McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp., 6Qg
A.2d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (finding alternative liability applicable to case
involving tainted lasagna); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)
(allowing use of market-share liability in DES context); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co .. 473
N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio 1984) (allowing use of alternative liability against suppliers in ethyl
acetate explosion); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (allowing use of
market-share liability in DES context); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co .. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984)
(allowing use of market-share liability in DES context).
63

See, e.g., Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying
Louisiana law to reject application of market-share liability to manufacturers of lead paint);
Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co .. 994 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Arkansas law to
reject application of alternative liability to manufacturers of asbestos): Doe v. Cutter
Biological, Div. of Miles, Inc .. g52 F. Supp. 909 (D. Idaho 1994) (applying Idaho law to reject
application of alternative liability to manufacturers of tainted blood products): Tidier v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.D.C. 1988) (applying Maryland and District of Columbia law to
reject market-share liability in DES context); Griftin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp.
964 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (applying North Carolina law to reject application of market-share
liability to manufacturers of benzidine congener dyes); Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d 690
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting application of market-share liability to manufacturers of
asbestos): Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) (rejecting use of market-share
liability in DES context); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986) (rejecting
use of market-share liability in DES context): Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo.
1984) (rejecting u'c of market-share liability in DES context); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., Div.
of Am. Cyanamid Co .. 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989) (rejecting application of market-share
liability to manufacturers of DTP vaccine): Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co .. 696 N.E.2d 187
(Ohio 1998) (rejecting use of market-share liability in DES context); Case v. Fibreboard
Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okl. J9g7) (rejecting application of market-share liability to
manufacturers of asbestos): Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharms. Inc .. 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988)
(rejecting application of market-share liability to manufacturers of DTP vaccine); Gorman v.
Abbott Labs., 599 A.2d 1364 (R.I. 1991) (rejecting application of market-share liability to
drug manufacturers).
64
See. e.g .. Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546 (I st Cir. 1993) (applying
Massachusetts law to hold market-share liability inapplicable to products liability action
involving lead paint); Sanderson v. Int' I Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C. D.
Cal. 1996) (applying California law to hold alternative liability and market-share liability
inapplicable to products liability action involving fragrance produch): Marshall v. Celotex
Corp .. 651 F. Supp. 3g9 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying Michigan law to hold alternative liability
inapplicable to products liability action involving asbestos); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois.
Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997) (holding alternative liability inapplicable to products liability
action involving asbestos); Murphy v. E. R. Syuibb & Sons, Inc .. 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985)

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

11

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

1040

[Vol. 56:1029

revolutionary and those that decry them as an abandonment of fundamental tort law
can be explained, in part, by the lack of consensus on the precise rationale that
underlies the doctrines. 65
Even a cursory examination of the facts in Summers and Sindell quickly
illuminates why alternative liability and market-share liability are so problematic
from a traditional tort law perspective. In both cases, the plaintiffs injury was most
likely the result of the acts of only one defendant, but other defendants were also
held liable. 66 Such a result seems to tly in the face of the cause-in-fact requirement. 67
This has led some commentators to suggest that the doctrines, especially marketshare liability, represent an abandonment of the traditional cause-in-fact requirement
in favor of liability based purely on creation of unreasonable risk. 68 Another possible
explanation is that the doctrines simply relax the plaintiff's burden of proof of cause-

(holding that failure to join substantial share of manufacturers made market-share liability
inapplicable in DES action); Edwards v. A.L. Lease & Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding alternative liability and market-share liability inapplicable to products
liability action involving defective residential drain pipe); Setliff v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding alternative liability and marketshare liability inapplicable in action brought by paint store employee against manufacturers of
various harmful chemicals); Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding market-share liability inapplicable to products liability action
involving asbestos); Bly v. Tri-Continental Indus., Inc., 663 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1995) (holding
alternative liability inapplicable to action against manufacturers of petroleum products); King
v. Cutter Labs., Div. of Miles, Inc., 685 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
market-share liability inapplicable to action against manufacturers of tainted blood product);
James v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 694 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding alternative
liability inapplicable to action against manufacturers of petroleum products); Goldman v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (holding alternative liability
inapplicable to products liability action involving asbestos); Skipworth by Williams v. Lead
Indus. Ass'n, Inc .. 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997) (holding alternative liability and market-share
liability inapplicable to products liability action involving lead paint).
65

Professor Geistfeld states that neither the courts nor academia has presented a clear and
convincing rationale for alternative liability and market-share liability thus far and that this
leads courts to be "understandably wary." Geistfeld, supra note I, at 452.
6

f'Porat and Stein opine that:
[t]he evidential remedy that shifts the persuasion burden to the defendant
unsuitable in many cases. This remedy can be effective only when the
direct damage and evidential damage are attributable to the same defendant.
direct and evidential wrongdoers are two different persons, ... shifting the
persuasion would not be justified: a person allegedly responsible for the
direct damage must not bear liability for another person's wrong.
ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 165 (2001).
67

would be
plaintiffs
When the
burden of
plaintiffs

See supra note 25.

6

NSee, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases. 68 VA. L. REv. 713 ( 1982) (proposing that market-share liability represents attachment
and appm1ionment of liability based on each defendant's contribution to the aggregate risk of
harm); accord David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort Svstem, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 866-68 (1984); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1819-20 (1985).
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in-fact in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy. 6 ~ As Professor Geistfeld points out, both
of these explanations are "problematic." 70
A conception of alternative liability and market-share liability in which liability
is determined purely by creation of unreasonable risk suffers from several faults.
Initially, it fails to explain convincingly why creation of unreasonable risk should
expand the set of liable parties in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy, but not in other
cases, such as when only one person has behaved tortiously or when several persons
have behaved tortiously but cause-in-fact can be demonstrated against the true
tortfeasor. If taken to its logical conclusion, a risk-contribution regime need not
require that the conduct in question ever injure anyone at all so long as it creates an
unreasonable risk that such an injury might occur. 71 Indeed, a tort system that adopts
risk-contribution on more than a superficial level would probably resemble a socialinsurance scheme rather than the current adversarial system in place today. 72
Moreover, it is clear that many courts are unwilling to impose a regime in which
liability attaches based purely on exposure to risk. 73
Likewise, explaining alternative liability and market-share liability as a
relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proof with regard to cause-in-fact raises similar

69

Geistfeld, supra note I, at 456-57.

70

/d. at 457.

71

"A deterrence-based torts system devises liability rules in order to reduce unreasonable
risks. That objective does not depend upon the occurrence of physical harm, because an actor
who faces liability for creating an unreasonable risk has an incentive to act reasonably."
Geistfeld, supra note I, at 449. While such a result can be defended as furthering deterrence
goals, the administrative costs of maintaining private litigation in the courts might lead to the
conclusion that a system of pure regulatory penalties would be more efficient in terms of cost
of enforcement versus resulting deterrence.
72

See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75-76 (Iowa 1986); accord PORAT &
STEIN, supra note 66, at 192. One can imagine enforcement through assessment of regulatory
fines against persons creating unreasonable risks of harm to others. Those fines could be
aggregated into a common fund (or funds) from which compensation would be paid out to
persons injured by the fruition of those unreasonable risks. PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at
I 04. Such a system suffers from a multitude of practical concerns beyond the immediate
administrative costs, including defining the scope of relevant risks for purposes of aggregating
recovered penalties into common funds for compensation purposes, as well as loss of a truly
adversarial forum in which the defendant's motivation to defeat liability is directly balanced
against the plaintiff's motivation to establish liability and recover. Moreover, such a system is
unlikely to function properly because almost all persons creating unreasonable risks would
need to be prosecuted and pay into the system. /d. at 109. Yet, persons who have not suffered
harm may be unlikely to notice their exposure to risk and have less incentive to report
violations because they will not be entitled to compensation from the common fund. ld. at
I 09-10. For a detailed discussion of the problems inherent in administrative replacements for
common law tort actions. see Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective
Re.1ponsihility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform. 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 885-898 ( 1987).
71

See Geistfeld. supra note I. at 452. Even the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the only court
to explicitly adopt any form of risk-contribution theory, stated that it "d[id] not agree that [risk
contribution] is a sufficient basis in itse!ffor liability," instead requiring some indication that a
defendant "reasonably could have contributed in some way to the actual injury." Collins v. Eli
Lilly Co .. 342 N.W.2d 37. 49 n.l 0 (Wis. 1984) (emphasis added).
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i~sues. There is seemingly no justification for why such relaxation of the burden of
proof is permissible in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy, but not in situations where
other factors make it difficult for plaintiff to prove cause-in-fact under the more
likely than not standard. 7.J The arbitrariness of such an explanation is further
highlighted by many courts' insistence that at some undefined point thereare simply
7
too manv defendants and relaxation of the burden then becomes "unfair." '
Whe~her explained by relaxation, risk-contribution, or some other novel theory
for attachment of liability, the case law indicates that many courts are unwilling to
76
In light
indulge a theory that diverges significantly from traditional tort concepts.
of that reluctance, it seems prudent to determine if either alternative liability or
market-share liability can be explained using traditional tort concepts, rather than a
novel approach.
Professor Geistfeld offers a theory of how the doctrines function that at first
appears to comport with traditional tort law. He argues that alternative liability can
be entirely explained by evidential grouping 77 and that market-share liability is
simply alternative liability modified to apportion liability between the defendants
fairly. 7K Put simply, evidential grouping allows a plaintiff to group the defendants
7
.JSI!e Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 222 (Or. 1988).
Professor Geistfeld notes that "tortious conduct routinely creates factual uncertainty regarding
causation," yet in most of these cases plaintiff still bears the burden of proof. Geistfeld, supra
note 1. at 456-57.
75

Sa Senn, 751 P.2d at 222.

76

Sce supra note 63.

77

Geistfeld, supra note I, at 471-77.

~/d. at 452. Even under the traditional conceptions of alternative liability and marketshare liability. the latter is often viewed as a variation of the former. The Sinde/1 court's
explanation for its adoption of market-share liability clearly indicates that the court believed
that market-share liability was a logical outgrowth of alternative liability. Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980). Nonetheless, the Sinde/1 court acknowledged that an
··undiluted Summers rationale [was] inappropriate" because the number of DES manufacturers
created "a possibility that none of the tive defendants in this case produced the offending
substance." hi. In response, the court chose to '·approach the issue of causation from a
different perspective'· and allow recovery based on the "corresponding likelihood" that the
··percentage [of! DES sold by each [defendant] for the purpose of preventing miscarriage" was
the same as the "likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly
injured plaintiff." /d. at 937. This probabilistic explanation for market-share liability has led
other courts to conclude that market-share liability cannot be justified by reference to its
forerunner. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that its previous adoption of
alternative liability could not justify adoption of market-share liability. Sutowski v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 690 N .E.2d 1117, 191 (Ohio 1998). The critical distinction for the court was that
alternative liability did not "relieve the plaintiff of the burden of identifying the tortfeasors."
/d. To recuver under alternative liability the plaintiff was required to point to all the
tortfea~.ors and demonstrate that they had behaved tortiously toward him. /d. The typical
justification for market-share liability. that there is a likelihood that all defendants have
behaved tortiow.ly towards some victim, was not compatible with this requirement. /d.; see
ulso New York Tel. Co. v. AAER Sprayed Insulations, Inc., 679 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (stating that "[ijn contrast [to market-share liability], under alternative liability, a
nexus between each defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury is fundamental"); accord
Thomp,on v. John-; lvlanville Sales Corp .. 714 F.2d 58!, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
7
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together and prove that, more likely than not, the conduct of the group was the causein-fact of the plaintiff's injury. 79 Professors Prosser and Keeton's reformulation of
the substantial factor test used in cases of multiple sufficient causes is a prime
example of the evidentiary grouping principle. so Geistfeld argues that evidential
grouping properly explains alternative liability in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy
hecause requiring "proof of individualized, but-for causation would absolve each
defendant" despite the fact that the true tortfeasor is among the defendants. HI
Although this explanation looks promising, there is a major flaw in the analogy
between tortfeasor indeterminacy and the situation of multiple sufficient causation in
which evidentiary grouping is traditionally applied.
Evidentiary grouping is justified in cases of multiple sufficient causation because
the normal evidentiary burden would absolve both defendants, even though the
conduct of either was sufficient to bring about the harm. H2 Such a situation is not
present in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy. 83 In essence, Geistfeld argues that it is
justifiable in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy to disallow use of exculpatory
evidence by a defendant whose conduct is not the cause-in-fact of the harm in order
to prevent the escape of the defendant whose conduct is the cause-in-fact of the
84
harm.
Such a result is inherently less equitable than allowing use of evidentiary
grouping in multiple sufficient causation where either defendant taken alone would
be a but-for cause of the harm. 85

application of alternative liability in the absence of '·such connection would beg the question
of causation entirely"). This result does not arise under the conception of alternative liability
proposed in this note because even if plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was exposed to a
particular defendant's breach of duty with regard to the primary injury, plaintiff can still
recover if he can show that he suffered a secondary injury through obfuscation of the causal
analysis as a result of defendant's conduct. See infra Part Ili.B. Whether or not a particular
defendant caused the primary injury, all defendants "certainly int1icted the plaintiff's
evidential damage and wrongfully so." PORAT & STEIN. supra note 66, at 169.
79

Geistfeld. supra note I, at 460. Evidentiary grouping can be differentiated from
doctrines of liability grouping. Liability grouping allows one defendant to be held liable for
the tortious conduct of another because the defendants have "acted as a group in causing
plaintiffs injury," as in a case of concert of action or conspiracy. /d. In contrast, evidentiary
grouping simply aids the plaintitl in proving his prima facie case, with liability attaching to
each defendant's conduct based on its own tortious nature. !d.
xoSa supra note 16.
~ 1 Gcistfeld, supra note I, at 464, 469-73.
2
R See

sources cited supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.

x \)'a discussion supra note 25.
1

x' Geistfeld,

supra note I, at 463-64.

'"As one commentator has noted. the substantial factor test, from which the principle of
evidentiary grouping is derived, should only be used in '"combined force' situations in which
we are morally certain that the hut-for test stubbornly persists in yielding the wrong answer."
Robertson. supra note 9, at 1778-80. Application of the substantial factor test outside the
narrow realm of multiple sufficient causation is completely inappropriate. !d. at 1779-80.
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Geistfeld justifies his conclusion by examining the "evidentiary inconsistency
produced by this form of exculpatory proof." 86 He argues that because the defendant
is a member of a group that has caused the harm, a defendant that points to the
probability that another group member was just as likely the cause would
87
''effectively den[y] that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the defendants." This
justification is unsatisfactory because it presupposes that the plaintiff should be
allowed to group the defendants for evidentiary purposes.
B. Understanding Alternative Liability as an Independent Cause of Action
The inequity in Geistfeld's approach can be resolved by redefining the injury to
the plaintiff that allows grouping the defendants together. Geistfeld conceives of
alternative liability as a doctrine that shifts the burden of proof on cause-in-fact with
regard to the plaintiff's injury in the same manner and for the same reasons that
burden shifting is applied in cases of multiple sufficient causation. This explanation
fails because multiple sufficient causation and tortfeasor indeterminacy are not
sufficiently analogous. However, if the defendants are grouped together based on
their contribution to the plaintiff's inability to determine the true tortfeasor, rather
than the statistical probability that each defendant might be the true tortfeasor,
shifting the burden of proof on cause-in-fact to the defendants can be rationally
justified.
A defensible explanation of alternative liability then initially requires recognition
that the doctrine is in reality an independent cause of action for the plaintiffs loss of
remedy. Professor Prosser proposed a very similar idea as the solution to a
particularly troublesome variation of multiple sufficient causation. 88 Likewise, Porat
and Stein propose a broad tort cause of action for what they refer to as "evidential
damage." 89 While neither of those theories focus on the loss of remedy itself in the

8

"Geistfeld, supra note 1. at 466.

87/d.
88
In that case, the first defendant had leased the second defendant a car with defective
breaks. Saunders Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams. I I 7 So. 72. 73 (Ala. 1928). While later
driving the car, the second defendant collided with the plaintiff, and it was shown that the
second defendant had failed to even apply the brakes. /d. at 74. The Alabama Supreme Court
refused to allow liability against either defendant because the brakes, though defective, were
never used, and if they had been used they would not have worked. !d. In effect, "each
defendant's wrongful conduct kept the other's from becoming operative," derailing the
determination of cause-in-fact. Robertson. supra note 9, at 1787. Commenting on Saunders,
Prosser suggested that both defendants might have been held accountable because "each, by
his negligence, has deprived the plaintiff of a cause of action against the other, and so should
be liable." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS ~ 41, at 239-40 n.25 (4th ed. West
1971 ). The precise scenario is somewhat different than that presented in cases of tortfeasor
indeterminacy because in Saunders either defendant's conduct would have been a but-for
cause of the harm in the absence of the other defendant's conduct. Nonetheless. the essence of
Prosser's independent tort against one wrongdoer for deprivation of the case against another
wrongdoer functions just as well in a case of tortfeasor indeterminacy.

89

PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66. at 160-206. The "evidential damage doctrine" they
propose focuses on an offending party's "infring[ing] the plaintiffs legitimate interest in ...
information" that is "necessary for ascertaining the cause of her or his direct damage." /d. at
167. Thus, their theory is much broader than the theory put forth in this Note and would apply
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way proposed in this note, they demonstrate that a tort action based on defendant's
interference with plaintiff's successful pursuit of a legitimate suit is not such a
radical idea.
An understanding of alternative liability as a distinct cause of action begins with
the widely accepted principle that tortious conduct can create a "bundle" of risks any
of which the tortfeasor will be liable for if they come to fruition. 90 In a prototypical
case of tortfeasor indeterminacy, the plaintiff has suffered two distinct injuries.
Initially. plaintiff suffers the "primary" injury as a result of the tortious conduct of a
single tortfeasor. Plaintiff then suffers a "secondary" injury that is to some degree
derivative, the loss of his remedy for the primary injury due to the inability to
demonstrate cause-in-fact. 91 There is always the risk of the primary injury, but in
cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy, there is also a risk of the secondary injury. While
the proposition may seem peculiar, Joss of remedy as a distinct injury is consistent
with the definition of the term injury as "the violation of another's legal right, for
which the law provides a remedy." 92 Assuming that persons have a legally protected
right to redress for injury, then it logically follows that wrongful deprivation of that
right is, in itself, also an injury. There are strong indications that, in cases of
tortfeasor indeterminacy, the plaintiff has a legally protected right to redress for
injury.
C. Equitable and State Constitutional Guarantees as a Source for the Legal Right to
a Remedy

One possible source of a legal right to redress for injury might be found in state
constitutional protections. Equity jurisdiction is predicated on the maxim that
"equity will not suffer a wrong, or, as sometimes stated, a right, to be without a
remedy." 93 This maxim is concretized in many state constitutions in so-called "right
to remedy clauses." 94 Thirty-nine state constitutions contain right to remedy clauses
that "expressly guarantee every person remedies for all tortious injuries to 'their
persons, property, and reputation. "' 95
in many cases outside the realm of tortfeasor indeterminacy. /d. at 185. Nonetheless. their
theory applies to cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy in a similar fashion to that proposed in this
note, but ultimately reaches the opposing conclusion regarding the appropriateness of
allocating liability based on market-share. /d. at 162, 186-87.
90

See Marshall v. Nugent. 222 F.2d 604,610-11 (1st Cir. 1955).

91
"Evidential damage must thus be perceived as an indirect or adjective damage: its
existence will always depend on the actual ... occurrence of a directly actionable damage."
PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 161.

92

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th ed. 2004).

93

30A C.J.S. Equity~ 130 (2007).

94

See Holland ex rei. Williams v. Mayes. 19 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1944); see also 16B
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 623 (2007); Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Right to a
Complete Remedy; Open Courts, in 3 ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29:15 (Roxanne
Barton Colin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2007).
95

Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Ri[?ht to a Complete Remedy; Open Courts, in 3
ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CASES§ 29:15 (Roxanne Barton Colin & Gregory S. Cusimano
eds., 2007). See, e.f?., ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; ARK. CON ST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CON ST. art. II,
§ 6; CONN. CONST. art. I. § I 0; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CON ST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CON ST.
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A right to remedy provision of a state constitution has already been utilized in at
least one case of tortfeasor indeterminacy. In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 96 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court justified its adoption of market-share liability, in part, on
that state's constitutional guarantee of a remedy at law. 97 Indeed, the court
concluded that by virtue of the right to remedy provision of the Wisconsin
Constitution the plaintiff was '"entitled to a remedy at law for her injuries." 9g
However, the manner in which the Collins court utilized the right to remedy clause
appears inconsistent with the court's own interpretation that the provision allows
'"the common law ... to grow ... within the doctrine of stare decisis ... applying
principles of common law to new situations as the need [arises]." 99 Rather than
applying established common law principles in an attempt to fashion a remedy, the
Collins court adopted market-share liability under a conception of that doctrine that
it acknowledged "deviate[d] from traditional notions of tort law."HxJ The result is
unfortunate because the Collins court had before it adequate law that, if applied
creatively, would have allowed the court to circumvent the plaintiff's tortfeasor
indeterminacy problem and provide a remedy using established tort principles.
Right to remedy provisions originally found their way into state constitutions, in
large part, as a bulwark against perceived legislative curtailment of common law
rights. 101 Hence, courts often employ such provisions to invalidate statutory
abridgment of common law rights when a legislature "impose[s] an impossible
condition on plaintiffs access to courts and ability to pursue an otherwise valid tort
claim." 102 Often, a constitutional right to remedy is recognized only as a guarantee
of remedy for rights already recognized by statute or common law. 103 Thus, such a
provision is typically not interpreted to confer any quasi-legislative power upon
courts, but rather emphasizes that courts must be free to "exercise the recognized
judicial power of applying established principles of law to new conditions and new
facts as they arise" so long as the injury "constitutes an invasion of a legal right." 104
This interpretation appears consistent with the notion that equity jurisdiction is
art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MISS.
CONST. art. Ill, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, §
13; N.C. CONST. art. I,§ 18; N.D. CONST. art. I,§ 9; OHIO CONST. art. I,§ 16; OKLA. CONST.
art. II,§ 6; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 10; PA. CONST. art. I,§ II; S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 9; S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 20; TENN. CON ST. art. I, § I 7; TEX. CON ST. art. I, § I 3; UTAH CONST. art. I, § II; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. I § 9; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18.
96

342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).

97

/d. at 45.

ygld.

100/d.
101

See Peck & Miltenberg, supra note 94.

102

Martin v. Richey. 7 I I N.E.2d 1273, I 284 (Ind. 1999) (holding application of two-year
statute of limitations unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff whose latent breast cancer
precluded discovery of the injury prior to the expiration of the limitation period).
103
104

Barnes v. Kyle, 306 S.W.2d I, 3 (Tenn. 1957).

Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-5 I (Fla. I Y45).
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limited to situations in which establi~hed law is in some way incapable of vindicating
a plaintiffs rights. 105
Despite the limitation that they cannot create entirely new means of redress, right
to remedy provisions are adequate to provide a means to protect plaintiffs in cases of
tortfeasor indeterminacy. As Professor Geistfcld points out, in cases of tortfeasor
indeterminacy the plaintiff has already sufficiently demonstrated that he is legally
entitled to a remedy at law against some member of the group of indeterminate
106
tortfeasors.
The plaintiff is deprived of a remedy at common law that he would
otherwise be entitled to by an evidentiary difficulty that results from the wrongful
conduct of the indeterminate tortfeasors. 107
The historical backdrop of right to remedy provisions does not necessitate a
conclusion that they can only be used as a shield against legislative obstruction of
legal redress. The same concern that a plaintiff will be faced with "impossible
conditions" to recovery are present when the plaintiff is deprived of his legal remedy
by the nature of some private party's conduct. In Collins, the court noted that the
evidentiary difficulty created hy the nature of the defendants' conduct resulted in an
"insurmountable obstacle" for the plaintiff "even if she can establish all the
remaining elements of her cause of action." 10x There is little practical difference
between attempted legislative curtailment and the evidentiary difficulty created by
tortfeasor indeterminacy. Tortfeasor indeterminacy confronts a plaintiff with hurdles
to recovery that are just as "impossible" and "insurmountable" as statutory
abridgement of a common law right. Thus. by the nature of their conduct,
indeterminate tortfeasors have violated plaintiffs legal right to a remedy as surely as
a legislature that imposes an unconstitutional statute of limitations or repose. Collins
seems to support this conclusion.
Because no legislative curtailment was involved in Collins, it appears the court
broadly interpreted the right to remedy provision of the Wisconsin Constitution as a
protection against curtailment of existing legal rights by both public and private

105

The maxim that "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy" generally
provides for equitable jurisdiction only where (I) "the right itself' is "not recognized as
existing by the law," (2) the right exists at law but the remedy is "one which the law cannot or
does not administer at all," or (3) the right exists at law but "the remedy as administered by
the law [is] inadequate, incomplete, or uncertain." Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 843 A.2d 758,
774 n.l2 (Md. 2004) (quoting 2 POMEROY, EQl:ITY JURISPRUDENCE§§ 423,424 (5th ed.)).
106

Geistfeld, supra note I, at 471. In other words, the plaintiff has demonstrated that he
can prove every single element of the underlying tort against the indeterminate tortfeasors,
save cause-in-fact. Moreover. the plaintiff has shown that only the nature of the indeterminate
tortfeasors' conduct prevents him from proving cause-in-fact against one of them and
recovering compensation. PoRAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 174-75.
107
The Sinde/1 court examined and rejected this explanation, stating that "although the
absence of such evidence i' not attributable to the defendants eitht>r, their conduct in
marketing a drug the etlects of which are delayed for many years played a significant role in
creating the unavailability of proof." Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
The court patently contradicted itself by asserting that the plaintiff's inability to prove causein-fact was not "attributable" to the defendants, while simultaneously noting the "significant
role" their conduct played in creating that result.
10

xCollins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,45 (Wis. !984).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

19

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

1048

[Vol. 56:1029
109

actors when it concluded that the plaintiff was "entitled to a remedy."
This then
lays the foundation for a defensible justification of why the court could have applied
alternative liability in Collins. Plaintiff was entitled to her remedy at common law
110
by virtue of the right to remedy provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.
However, the nature of the defendants' conduct made it impossible for plaintiff to
establish cause-in-fact against the true tortfeasor, thereby infringing her right to
remedy under the Wisconsin Constitution.
This violation of the plaintiff's
constitutionally protected right to a remedy constituted a distinct injury from the
primary injury. The court could then have used its equitable power under the right to
remedy provision itself to allow recovery for violation of that right against all the
indeterminate tortfeasors because the conduct of all of them contributed to plaintiff's
loss of remedy. 111 In this way, the court could have provided the plaintiff with a
remedy while remaining faithful to its previous interpretation that the Wisconsin
Constitution's right to remedy provision allowed the court to craft a remedy using
established tort principles. 112
While right to remedy provisions of state constitutions provide a potentially
weighty source for the legal rights violated by the actions of defendants in cases of
tortfeasor indeterminacy, complete reliance on such provisions may not be possible
in every state. Initially, it is important to remember that not all state constitutions
contain a right to remedy provision. 113 In states with constitutions that do contain
right to remedy provisions, there is still the possibility that such a provision will not
be held applicable to the actions of private parties. 114 However, even if a state's
constitutional right to remedy provision does not provide a directly actionable right
that can form the basis of a tort action against private parties, it might still support a
convincing public policy argument in favor of recognizing a cause of action for
deprivation of remedy. 115 In states with no constitutional right to remedy provision
at all, a court might still be swayed by the underlying equitable maxim that such a
provision represents. 116 Moreover, in states with right to remedy provisions, it seems
109/d.
I

10

/d.

111

This result may appear a little odd in that the right to remedy provision provides both
the legal right that is violated and the means to vindicate that right, but there is nothing that
indicates such a result is wrong.
112

See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.

113

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

114

For example, many provisions of the North Carolina Constitution have been interpreted
"chiefly to protect the individual from the State." State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C.
1949). In a subsequent appellate opinion, the court relied on this justification in rejecting
several claims under the state constitution by a private employee against his employer.
Teleflex Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arnold, 513 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
115

Despite the Teleflex court's general disapproval of a constitutional right of action
against private parties, the court appeared to entertain an argument that the employer's actions
had violated public policy embodied in the North Carolina Constitution's right to remedy
provision, although ultimately concluding that the employer had made no such violation. /d.
at 88.
116

See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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logical that the weight of the underlying equitable maxim could only be strengthened
by such constitutional support.

D. Judicially Recognized Common Law Duty as a Source for the Legal Right to a
Remedy
Even completely absent any constitutional or equitable guarantee of a legal
remedy, an independent tort cause of action for deprivation of remedy could also
operate on the basis of a judicially recognized common law duty to refrain from
conduct that could foreseeably deprive an injured party of a remedy for injury to his
person or property by confusing the cause-in-fact determination. In Summers'
Canadian doppelganger. Cook v. Lewis, 117 the Canadian Supreme Court imposed
alternative liability, in part, on grounds that each defendant had "impaired the
[plaintiffs l remedial right of establishing liability . . . in effect, destroy[ing] the
victim's power of proof." 11 x Implicit in that statement is recognition that the legal
right to redress for injury creates a corresponding duty not to interfere with that right,
at least with regard to persons who have behaved tortiously to an injured party.
In a variety of contexts. courts have addressed similar issues and held that
persons have a duty not to impair a plaintiffs lawsuit or otherwise deprive plaintiff
of a remedy for injury. For example, federal courts have recognized a cause of action
against a government official whose conduct interferes with or deprives a plaintiff of the
ability to bring suit. 119 Likewise, some courts have recognized an independent cause of
action for negligent spoliation of evidence by a party to the underlying action. 120 Other
courts have also recognized an independent cause of action for negligent spoliation of
evidence by a nonparty to the underlying action. 121 Still other courts do not recognize

117

[1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.).

118

/d. at832.

119

See De Nardo v. Schowen, 944 F.2d 908, 908 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[i]t is
certainly correct that the unlawful deprivation of a cause of action may rise to the level of a
constitutional tort"); see also Pritchard v. Norton. 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882) (stating that "a
vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and
is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Whether it springs from contract or from
the principles of the common law. it is not competent for the legislature to take it away");
accord Ban·ett v. United State>. 798 F.2d 565,575 (2d Cir. 1986).
120
See, e.g., In re Srnartalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig .. 487 F. Supp. 2d 947 (S.D. Ohio
2007) (applying Ohio law); Foster v. Lawrence Mern'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 83 (D. Kan. 1992)
(applying Kansas law); Holmes v. Arnerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu v.
Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), disapproved by Martino v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc .. 908 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2005); Welton v. Ambrose. 814 N.E.2d 970 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004); Swick v. New York Times Co., 815 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003);
Gicking v. Joyce Int'llnc .. 33 Pa. D. & C.4th 208 (Pa. Corn. Pl. 1996).

121
See, e.g., Poynter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)
(applying Tennessee law); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Thompson ex rei. Thompson v. Owensby. 704 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Oliver
v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d II (Mont. 1999); Callahan v. Stanley Works. 703 A.2d 1014
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997); Hannah v. Heeter. 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va. 2003).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

21

1050

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56: 1029

negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent cause of action, but still allow such
claims under general negligence principles, 122
A cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence is not precisely analogous
to the situation presented by tortfeasor indeterminacy. Spoliation of evidence, as the
term is used by most courts, refers to destruction of evidence after the tortious action
has already occurred. In contrast, tortfeasor indeterminacy results from evidential
obfuscation that arises concurrently with the tortious action itself. The evidential
obfuscation is not the result of some person's subsequent act, but rather it is an
inherent consequence of the combined conduct of the indeterminate tortfeasors.
Nonetheless, this discontinuity between negligent spoliation of evidence and
tortfeasor indeterminacy is not problematic. The willingness of some courts to
recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence is still persuasive
precedent for a duty not to obfuscate a victim's ability to prove cause-in-fact and
prevent recovery, at least in certain circumstances.
While agreeing that an underlying duty not to negatively affect a victim's lawsuit
through evidential obfuscation could explain alternative liability, Professor Geistfcld
questions whether such an explanation can account for Summers and Silulell in light
of later California precedent. 123 At one time, California precedent clearly recognized a
tort cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. 124 The validity of that precedent
was later cast into doubt by the California Supreme Court's refusal to recognize an action
for intentional spoliation of evidence in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior
Court 125 and Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court. 126 Thus, while the
California Supreme Court did not directly address the existence of a cause of action for
negligent spoliation of evidence, the appellate courts have assumed that the rationale of
Cedars-Sinai and Temple preclude its further existence. 127
122
See, e.g., Tietjen v. Hamilton-Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., Nos. 97-CY-188, 97-CV-949.
1998 WL 865586 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1998) (applying New York law): Smith v. Atkinson.
771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co .. 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995): Guillory
v. Dillard's Dep't Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d I (La. Ct. App. 2000); Gilleski v. Cmty. Mcd. Ctr..
765 A.2d 1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc .. 905 P.2d ~~-~
(N.M. 1995); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65 <Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
123

Geistfeld, supra note I, at 484 n.l 02.

124

See Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983) (holding that, upon amendment of the
complaint, plaintiff might be able to establish facts sufficient to show that police officer
undertook a duty to preserve evidence necessary for plaintiff to recover civil damages for auto
accident); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 19~0)
(holding that complaint against maintenance company for disposal of broken bottle needed for
subsequent products liability action stated a recognized claim for negligent destruction of
evidence); Clemente v. State, 161 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing action against
police officer whose "negligence in his conduct of [a] discretionary investigation" of an auto
accident resulted in "virtual destruction of any opportunity on [plaintiffs] part to ohtain
compensation for his physical injuries from the apparent tortfeasor").
125

954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) (holding that no caw.e of action exists for intenLional
spoliation of evidence by a party to the underlying lawsuit).
126

976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999) (holding that no cause of action exi,ts for intentional
spoliation of evidence by a third party not involved in the underlying lawsuit).
127

See, e.g., Coprich v. Supetior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884. 887-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000):
Fam1ers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 55-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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Nonetheless, that a particular jurisdiction has not previously recognized a duty to
prevent evidential obfuscation and the resulting loss of remedy in cases of tortfeasor
indeterminacy need not prevent it from doing so in the future. As the California
Supreme Court has noted:
[tJhe assertion that liability must nevertheless be denied because
defendant bears no "duty'· to plaintiff "begs the essential question-whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct. ... It (duty) is a shorthand statement of a conclu~ion,
rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... But it should be recognized that
'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection." 12 x
This conception of the element of duty virtually compels a court to make a
careful analysis that is sensitive to not only preexisting law, but also policy
ramifications when determining the existence of a duty. In the particular sphere of
issues that tortfeasor indeterminacy involves. the Summers and Sindell courts came
to the conclusion that persons deprived of their traditional remedy by the nature of
the underlying tortious conduct that injured them were entitled to protection. Thus.
recognition of a limited duty particular to cases involving tortfeasor indeterminacy
would not be an extension of previously unknown protection to plaintiffs, but only
an explanation of existing protection that comports with traditional notions of how
tort law functions.
Furthermore, an examination of the rationale behind Cedars-Sinai and Temple
demonstrates that these cases should not control the California Supreme Court's
determination of whether to recognize a duty to prevent evidential obfuscation in
cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy. The key policy considerations that led the court to
reject a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence are not applicable to
cases involving tortfeasor indeterminacy. The court pointed to three policy
considerations that weighed heavily against recognizing negligent ~poliation of
evidence: "the conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party spoliation
and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related
misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies for spoliation; and the
uncertainty of the fact of hann in spoliation cases." 129
Unlike in Cedars-Sinai and Temple, the evidential obfuscation in cases of
tortfeasor indeterminacy is not the result of subsequent litigation-related misconduct.
The evidential spoliation in Cedars-Sinai and Temple is factually distinguishable
from the evidential obfuscation in cases involving tortfeasor indeterminacy. CedarsSinai and Temple involved conduct that was both intentional and subsequent to the
primary injury. On the other hand, tortfeasor indeterminacy involves a secondarily
negligent aspect of already tortious conduct. Moreover, imposition of a duty to
prevent evidential obfuscation in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy would not lead to
the potential cycle of "endless litigation" that is a concern in casei-. of spoliation of

12

~Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW

OF TORTS
129

332-33 (3d ed. 1964) ).

Cedars-Sinai. 954 P.2d at 515.
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evidence. 130 The court also determined that sufficient non-tort remedies for
evidential spoliation existed in the form of evidential inferences with regard to
destroyed evidence, civil sanctions, and criminal penalties. 131 The factual differences
between evidence spoliation and tortfeasor indeterminacy render all of these non-tort
remedies inapplicable. Finally, the court pointed to the factual uncertainty of harm
12
that would require a "retrial within a trial" in some cases of spoliation of evidence. L
This would not be of concern in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy because the causal
scenario itself will demonstrate the factual certainty of plaintiff's secondary injury. 133
Therefore, previous precedent that declined to recognize a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence should not preclude the California Supreme Court from
explaining alternative liability in terms of a common law duty to prevent one's
already tortious conduct from obfuscating the determination of cause-in-fact and
thereby depriving the victim of a remedy.
E. Operation of Alternative Liability as an Independent Cause of Action

Once loss of remedy is recognized as a distinct secondary injury, alternative
liability can be conceptualized without resort to novel theories of liability for the
primary injury. Rather, alternative liability is actually shorthand for the application
of several traditional tort law doctrines in a separate cause of action for the negligent
deprivation of remedy. 134
To comport with traditional tort law, the risk of the secondary injury would have
to be foreseeable, or else the defendants would have no duty to guard against it. 115
Therefore, to apply alternative liability it is necessary to determine whether, given
the nature of the defendants' tortious conduct and the circumstances surrounding the
conduct, there was a foreseeable risk that a potentially injured party might be unable
to determine the responsible tortfeasor. 136 An examination of the case law shows that
there is such a foreseeable risk in most cases when alternative liability has been
applied. 137 Alternative liability can then be understood as imposing a duty on
130

/d. at 516-17.

131

/d. at 517-18.

132

/d. at 520.

133

See sources cited supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.

134

This characterization of the cause of action for deprivation of remedy as a species of
negligence should not be confused with the underlying tortious nature of the primary injury.
As application of cause of action in the DES scenario makes clear, alternative liability is just
as applicable when the cause of action for the primary injury sounds in strict products liability.
135

KEETON ET AL.,

supra note 7, at 162.

136

Clearly, this is a consideration that bears on the existence of duty and concerns of
proximate causation, not cause-in-fact.
137

The plaintiff in Sindell had argued that her inability to prove cause-in-fact was a
foreseeable consequence of the defendants' failure to label DES as experimental. Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 930 n.l4 (Cal. 1980). The court rejected this argument, stating
that the lack of evidence was the result of "the passage of time" rather than inadequate
warning labels. /d. at 930. Thus, Sindell's inability to prove cause-in-fact was not a "'direct
and foreseeable result' of defendants' failure to provide a warning label." /d. at 930 n.l4.
This conclusion ignores the potential foreseeability of duplicative tortious conduct in general.
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persons to refrain from tortious conduct that could prevent a person injured by such
conduct from determining the identity of the responsible party. 138
Conceptualizing alternative liability in this way explains why evidentiary
grouping is permissible. Each defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to refrain from
conduct that could foreseeably combine with the conduct of other defendants to
obfuscate the cause-in-fact determination and deprive plaintiff of a remedy for his
primary injury. Each defendant has breached this duty to plaintiff and the conduct of
the defendants has combined to cause the plaintiff's loss of remedy. 139 The
defendants may be grouped because they have affected a single injury.
This also explains why a defendant may not escape liability by asserting the
statistical probability that another defendant is just as likely the cause-in-fact of the
primary injury-the defendants are not being held liable for the primary injury.
With regard to the secondary injury, the reason defendants may not rely on
exculpatory evidence depends on the number of defendants. If there are only two
defendants, then both are necessary causes of the confusion and the resulting loss of
remedy; both are but-for causes and neither will be allowed to escape liability simply
because the other's conduct was also necessary. 140 If there are three or more
defendants, then the result is a case of multiple sufficient causation, 141 and a
defendant will not be permitted to assert the sufficiency of the other defendants'
conduct to relieve himself from liability. 142 As Professor Geistfeld points out, the
plaintiff makes his prima facie case against a defendant by proving that the group's
conduct was the cause-in-fact of his injury and that defendant is a member of the
Arguably, there was a foreseeable risk that a person potentially injured by exposure to DES
would be unable to identify the manufacturer given the fungible nature of DES, its production
by a multitude of manufacturers, the fact that it was prescribed and distributed generically, the
lack of knowledge about its long-term effects, and its use by pregnant women. Porat and Stein
argue that in most cases a "defendant's (actual or imputed) awareness of the fact that their
actions may or may not end up in damage entails the (actual or imputed) awareness of the
ensuing causal uncertainty." PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 173. "A potential wrongdoer
ought to foresee the possibility that his action will int1ict a traceless physical damage." !d.
138
0thers have also noted that alternative liability functions to hold one defendant
"responsible for the way in which his tortious conduct interacted with the tortious conduct of
the other defendant." Geistfeld, supra note I, at 476; see also PO RAT & STEIN, supra note 66,
at 134. This would then mean that when a defendant's actions have created a case of
tortfeasor indeterminacy he "might find himself under the duty to take reasonable steps to
eliminate the uncertainty of the case." PO RAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 171.

139
This explains why the Summers court was able to conclude that both "defendants were
jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause of the injury or to that legal
effect." Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I, 2 (Cal. 1948). Such a statement is only coherent if the
injury referred to is the Joss of remedy, rather than the injury to Summers' eye.
140

See discussion supra note 13.

141

The situation is slightly more complicated than traditional multiple sufficient causation
because at least two indeterminate tortfeasors are necessary for deprivation of plaintiff's
remedy. Regardless, any individual defendant is a multiple sufficient cause as against any
other individual defendant.
142
See discussion supra note 16. The t1aw in Professor Geistfeld's explanation is simply
that the application of the evidentiary rule of multiple sufficient causation is direct rather than
by analogy.
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group. 14·1 Once the plaintiff proves his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
144
defendant just as it would after any standard plaintiff makes his prima facie case.
Recognition of loss of remedy as the injury that alternative liability is meant to
redress explains why the doctrine is limited to cases involving tortfeasor
indeterminacy. Alternative liability is not necessary in cases involving multiple
defendants where cause-in-fact can be demonstrated because there is no potential for
the loss of remedy. Likewise, alternative liability is inappropriate in cases where the
plaintiff simply cannot provide evidence that a lone defendant was actually the
cause-in-fact of his harm because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was
ever entitled to a remedy at all. 145 This explains why courts applying alternative
liability and market-share liability tend to emphasize the plaintiff's loss of remedy,
not the defendants' superior access to evidence. 146
F. Effect of this E.tplanation on the Viability of Market-Share Liability

Explaining alternative liability as providing redress for loss of remedy for the
primary injury leads to a two-fold conclusion regarding apportionment of liability.
Initially, this explanation of alternative liability demonstrates that joint and several
liability is the appropriate method for apportioning liability among the defendants
regardless of their number. Each defendant is equally responsible for the resulting
loss of remedy for the primary injury and because the loss of remedy is a single and
indivisible harm, traditional tort doctrine will hold each defendant liable for the
entire harm. 147 Moreover, because each defendant is liable for the entire harm there
is no reason to require joinder of all defendants. Nevertheless, since all defendants
are equally responsible, there is no equitable reason why the defendants should not
be free to apportion liability among themselves on a pro-rata basis. 14 ~

143

Geistfeld, supra note I, at 474.

144

A defendant can then refute the plaintiffs prima facie case against him in one of two
ways. First, a defendant might demonstrate that he could not be the cause-in-fact of the
plaintiffs primary injury. /d. at 475. By doing so, the defendant demonstrates that his
conduct did not contribute to the confusion and resulting loss of remedy; in essence, he proves
that he is not part of the group and should not bear their shared liability. Alternatively, a
defendant might demonstrate which defendant was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's primary
injury. /d. In doing this, the defendant essentially nullifies the effect of the group's conduct in
depriving plaintiff of a remedy, negating the grounds for group liability.
145

See sources cited supra note 106 and accompanying text.

14
"The confusion results from the Summers court's reference to Ybarra, which it found
"quite analogous" to the facts of Summers. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d L 4 (Cal. 1948).
Defendants' superior access to evidence was the motivation for allowing the plaintiff to utilize
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against multiple defendants. Ybarra v. Spangard. 154 P.2d
687. 690 (Cal. 1945). In Summers, by contrast. the defendants did not have superior access to
evidence. See Geistfeld, supra note I, at 473. Allowing the plaintiff to group defendants
together because the nature of their conduct had all contributed to the loss of remedy was what
made Ybarra and Summers analogous, not defendants' superior access to evidence .. /d.
147

See discussion supra note 13.

14

XSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 886A (1965). Reapportionment of liability
between defendants might result from named defendants impleading other potential tortfeasors
or from subsequent actions for contribution. The frequency of either situation would probably
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Conversely, this shows that market-share liability as a modification of alternative
liability is both unnecessary and inconsistent with the underlying rationale.
Apportioning liability based on market-share is unnecessary because that approach is
based on the faulty assumption that as the number of defendants increases the
probability that any one defendant caused the injury decreases. 149 This problem is
nullified by redefining alternative liability as compensating for loss of remedy, an
injury to which all defendants have contributed equally. Likewise, market-share
liability is inconsistent with alternative liability because a given defendant's share of
the relevant market, if one even exists, has no proportional bearing on his
contribution to the plaintiff's loss of remedy. 1" 0
Porat and Stein reach a seemingly unjustifiable rejection of this result in applying
their "evidential damage doctrine" to the prototypical DES market-share scenario. 151
After concluding that an independent action for evidential obfuscation and loss of
remedy could provide a means for recovery by plaintiffs faced with tortfeasor
indeterminacy, Porat and Stein conclude that liability should be apportioned on "the
value of the plaintiff's entitlement to information" as reflected in the "amount of
money that the plaintiff would be willing to pay to each manufacturer to ascertain
whether it is the one which actually inflicted her injury." 152 They then make an
unexplained jump to the conclusion that this value is reflected in the magnitude of
each defendant's risk-contribution and by derivation each defendant's share of the
relevant market. 151 Such a result is logically incomprehensible and appears
antithetical to their original proposition that recovery be based on the secondary
evidential damage rather than the primary tortious conduct. Further, it would negate
any potential benefit that could be derived from redefining the cause of action as an
independent tort for deprivation of remedy by arbitrarily re-injecting market-share
with its necessity of joining all potential tortfeasors and problematic determinations
of relevant markets. This can only lead to a conclusion that Porat and Stein have
erred and that joint and several liability is the appropriate means of apportionment
rather than market-share liability.

IV. CONCLUSION
The benefits of recognizing alternative liability as an independent cause of action
for deprivation of remedy are numerous. This explanation demonstrates that the
theoretical underpinnings of alternative liability are con~istent with the traditional
not be so high as to burden the court system. Given the potential for defendant insolvency, as
well as the potential that a defendant might be able to demonstrate that he could not have
caused the injury, the plaintiff has every incentive to join as many defendants as practicable.
1 9
•

see <;ources cited supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.

150

The duplicative aspect of the multiple defendants' conduct, not the quantity of that
conduct, results in the lm,s of remedy. A defendant contributes equally to the indeterminacy
whether his share of the market is 5% or 95c1c.
151
Viewing all the defendants who have confused the cause-in-fact inquiry as multiple
sufficient causes of the resulting injury to the plaintiff is rejected as "problematic·' with no
other explanation. PORAT & STEtN. surra note 66. at 187 n.5.
152

/d. at I 87.

153/d.
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tort law requirement that a defendant's conduct must be the cause-in-fact of a
plaintiff's harm; alternative liability is not truly novel because it merely relies on
careful application of pre-existing law. As shown above, alternative liability does
not hold innocent defendants liable for harm caused by others. Rather, it holds each
defendant responsible for the way in which his conduct has contributed to the loss of
plaintiff's remedy for the primary injury.
Perhaps just as important, explaining alternative liability as a separate cause of
action for loss of remedy provides a justification why alternative liability in its
"pure" form can be applied across the board. Each defendant has contributed equally
to the plaintiff's loss of remedy and so application of alternative liability remains
equitable regardless of how many defendants are involved. Further, this shows that
market-share liability is an unnecessary and inequitable extension of alternative
liability.
If courts understand alternative liability in this way, perhaps they will be more
likely to apply the doctrine in cases where it is needed. While this analysis may
vindicate courts that have rejected market-share liability as inconsistent with
traditional tort law, it also stands as a caution against discounting the possibility that
pre-existing legal concepts, if understood fully and applied correctly, can often
resolve new issues as they arise.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/7

28

